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1Abstract
This paper models the lobbying activity concerning a safeguard measure and applies it to
the empirical analysis to see if the monitoring system on a safeguard measure is administered
along with the WTO agreement or aﬀected by political factors. The model analysis describes
that there exists a potential mechanism that a rise in imports induces a political activity by
producers. The empirical analysis shows that the monitoring system on a safeguard measure is
not so neutral to the WTO conditions and it is more or less inﬂuenced by the political factors.
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21 Introduction
On 23 April 2001, Japan initiated provisional safeguard measures on Welsh onions, Shiitake mush-
rooms, and Tatami rushes, according to the WTO rule. This was the ﬁrst case in the sense that
Japan took a general safeguard measure1 and thereby tariﬀ quotas2 were imposed on them. Also,
the government expressed its willingness to carry out the structural adjustment policy to raise
the international competitiveness of these domestic farms. Following the enactment, on 22 June,
China who was the largest supplier of the subject goods took a retaliatory measure. It was a
100 percent special duty on cars, cellular phones, air-conditioners and some other imports from
Japan. At the end of the year, 21 December, both countries reached an agreement where Japan
agreed not to initiate its deﬁnitive safeguard measure, while China agreed to remove the special
duties. Consequently, a possible worst scenario was avoided. Behind this recent trade dispute
between China and Japan, there is a rapid increase in agricultural imports in Japan. It is due to
trade liberalization of agricultural goods after the Uruguay round, development-imports promoted
by Japanese trading houses, the following quality improvement, the improved infrastructures of
seaport in the countries concerned and so on.
Taking account of these situations surrounding agricultural trades, the Ministry of Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) prepared a monitoring system on particular goods, which enabled
it to collect any information necessary for the safeguard measure to be taken. The demand for
a safeguard is also growing. Many reports on the initiation of safeguard measures are handed in
from local authorities to the national government. The number of reports from local governments
and municipalities are 35 (31) and 1329 (1369) for the year of 2000 (2001), respectively3. And,
possibly, the long-standing recession in Japan may lead to the increase of the industries lobbying for
protection by safeguard. Takacs (1981) used the number of requests for a safeguard to International
1The general safeguard measure is the one based on GATT Article XIX and WTO safeguard agreement, while
the provisional safeguard measure is a special case of the general safeguard measure. See Section 2.1. Also, special
safeguard measures based on The WTO Agreement on agriculture and The WTO Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing are basically beyond the scope of this paper. See Jackson (1997) for issues relating to a safeguard measure.
2Tariﬀ quota is a policy to allow imports subject to current tariﬀ rates within a quota and restrict imports
subject to the national tariﬀ rates (created by the Cabinet Order) over the quota. Quotas on each subject goods
are determined based on three-year period average imports. See Abbott and Paarlberg (1998).
3Those numbers are counted upon the number of reports and petitions under the Local Autonomy Law Article
99 and 125, respectively.
3Trade Committee as an explanatory variable to show the degree of protectionism and examined
with a regression analysis under what conditions protectionism rises. What is noted is that the
number of requests increases when the real GNP becomes lower, when the unemployment rate
gets higher, when the balance of trade gets worse or when the import penetration ratio becomes
higher4. Thus, not only by the changing circumstance, but also by the additional alternative to
use safeguard measure, the trade policy of Japan, particular in agriculture, is now facing a new
situation5.
The safeguard measure protects the domestic producers from the losses caused by a sharp rise
in its competing imports. Then, it provides an opportunity to reduce adjustment costs and makes
easier the structural adjustment to be followed6. Some say that a safeguard measure acts as a
safety valve for unpredictable situations and it is therefore necessary to maintain and improve the
process of trade liberalization7. On the other hand, the safeguard measure increases the price of
the subject goods, resulting in the lower consumer surplus. Then, it is necessary to evaluate the
cost and beneﬁt of the safeguard measure in view of a society as a whole and, with its assessment,
we should consider whether it should be done or not.
Nevertheless, little attention has been paid to such considerations, because politicians often
exert their inﬂuences8. For a country to take a safeguard measure, the procedures are speciﬁed
under the GATT/WTO rules and the country must follow them rigorously. But, partly because
politicians have an incentive for what they will get in service, i.e., a political support and partly
because they are in a position to press the bureaucracies or the administrative agency on such
matters, a safeguard measure is often under a political inﬂuence.
As is often noted, this point is endemic to the administered protection including an anti-
dumping measure as well as a safeguard measure. Finger, Hall and Nelson (1982), Moore (1992a)
4In fact, the towel is a good of this point, though the special safeguard is to be applied. On 9 October 2002,
the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) made a negative decision about the safeguard measure on
imported towels and said that it did not take the measure concerned and that further investigations for another six
months are needed to see the change in its import.
5See the METI (2002).
6In the preamble, Article V, VII, and XII of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, a structural adjustment is
mentioned.
7See Bhala and Kennedy (1998) and, theoretically, Rosendorﬀ and Milner (2001).
8See Kimura (2001).
4and Hanson and Prusa (1997) empirically examined the determinants in the initiation of anti-
dumping tariﬀs in the United States and showed that political factors as well as some rule-
based factors are essential in its approval. In a similar vein, Tharakan (1991) and Eymann and
Schknecht (1993) applied to EC cases and got the similar results9.
Our objective in this paper is to empirically examine whether political factors play a key role
in the current Japanese safeguard implementation system of agricultural goods10. There are few
literatures for the Japanese administered protection, because the Japanese government had not
used it so often. A safeguard measure should be utilized under the certain rules for the sake of
the national economy as a whole and should not be utilized for the sake of pressure groups as a
small percentage of its population. So, it is meaningful to examine whether the current Japanese
safeguard implementation system of agricultural goods is neutral in terms of WTO rules or actually
strongly-inﬂuenced by domestic political factors.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a safeguard measure and sets out the
model. We argue that there is a mechanism that a rise in imports induces a political activity by
producers. This result is applied to an empirical analysis in Section 3 and therein we show that
the monitoring system on a safeguard measure is not so neutral to the WTO conditions and it is
more or less inﬂuenced by the political factors, in particular, the member of the Committee of the
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (CAFF). Section 4 concludes.
2 Safeguard Measure
2.1 Rules
A safeguard measure is a policy measure which allows a country to temporarily suspend its obliga-
tions as the member state of the WTO and thereby a tariﬀ increase and a quantitative restriction
are permitted to the country in the world trading system. The purpose of the safeguard measure is
to reduce the economic and social costs in the structural adjustment of domestic industries, which
is typically triggered by changes in terms of a comparative advantage, and make the structural
9Also, Moore (1992b) theoretically analyzes the inﬂuence of politicians on the administered protection.
10In a broader context, Anderson and Hayami (1986) examined the political economy of agriculture in East Asia
including Japan.
5adjustment easier.
In WTO, the safeguard measure is speciﬁed under the GATT Article XIX and the WTO
Agreement on Safeguards, while in Japan this type of a tariﬀ increase is speciﬁed under the
Customs Tariﬀ Law Article 9 and this type of a quantitative restriction is speciﬁed under the
Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law and the Import Trade Control Ordinance. Practically,
these articles allow a country to increase a tariﬀ or impose a quantitative restriction under some
rules. In what follows11, we describe the “some rules” in implementing a safeguard measure, i.e.,
the investigation on the subject products, restrictions on applied measures and negotiations with
countries having a substantial interest as the exporters of the product concerned.
In the implementation of a safeguard measure, the investigation, which is held by the “compe-
tent authorities” of the initiating country, has to show the following points12;
1. Increase in imports following unforeseen developments,
2. Serious injury caused to the domestic industry producing like or directly competitive prod-
ucts,
3. Causal link between imports and injury.
For the third point, in particular, the WTO Agreement on Safeguards Article 4.2 (a) states that,
“the competent authorities shall evaluate ⅄ the rate of and amount of the increase in imports
of the product concerned in absolute and relative terms, the share of the domestic market taken
by increased imports, changes in the level of sales, production, productivity, capacity utilization,
proﬁts and losses, and employment.” In addition to them, one more condition is put in place in
Japan under the Customs Tariﬀ Law Article 9, “if it is deemed urgently necessary to take such
measures in the interest of national economy.” Also, the country initiating a safeguard measure is
required to notify all of its investigations including the initiation, the loss and the implementation
of this measure to the WTO13.
11For the following contents of this subsection, Komuro (2001) is often referred to.
12See The WTO Agreement on Safeguards Article 2 and 4 and GATT Article XIX.
13See The WTO Agreement on Safeguards Article 3.
6It is noteworthy that there is an exceptional case for these conditions; even before the completion
of its investigation, a country is allowed to institute a safeguard measure. This is called a provisional
safeguard measure and the one used by the Japanese government in April 200114.
There are some restrictions when a safeguard measure is applied. For a tariﬀ increase, it shall
be within the price under-cutting by imported products as compared with the wholesale price of
domestic products and, for a quantitative restriction, it shall be equal to the average quantity level
of import during the appropriate three-year period15. The duration period shall not exceed four
years and, even if it is extended, it shall not exceed eight years16.
The country to initiate a safeguard measure has to make an opportunity to consult with “the
CONTRACTING PARTIES and those contracting parties having a substantial interest as exporters
of the product concerned”17 before taking its action. And, if it fails and the safeguard measure is
unilaterally taken, the aﬀected country was free to suspend part of its obligation18. However, the
aﬀected country is now unable to take any retaliatory measure for the ﬁrst three years “provided
that the safeguard measure has been taken as a result of an absolute increase in imports and that
such a measure conforms to the provisions of this Agreement”19.
By the way, as the WTO Agreement on Safeguards Article 3 indicates, it is the “competent
authorities” who investigate. In Japan, they are the ministers of the MOF (ministry of ﬁnance), the
MAFF, and the METI. Indeed, under several guidelines for an emergency tariﬀ and quota, some
bureaucrats from these ministries investigate on the subject product. In the following subsection,
we look closely at how players surrounding the safeguard measure are related each other.
14The WTO Agreement on Safeguards Article 6 states, “in critical circumstances where delay would cause damage
which it would be diﬃcult to repair, a Member may take a provisional safeguard measure pursuant to a preliminary
determination that there is clear evidence that increased imports have caused or are threatening to cause serious
injury.”
15See GATT Article XIX and The WTO Agreement on Safeguards Article 5, respectively.
16This is, what is called, a sunset provision. See The WTO Agreement on Safeguards Article 7. Also, for the
provisional safeguard measure, Article 6 states that it “shall not exceed 200 days, during which period the pertinent
requirements of Article 2 through 7 and 12 shall be met.”
17See The GATT Article XIX 2.
18See The GATT Article XIX 3.
19See The WTO Agreement on Safeguards Article 8.
72.2 Political Economy of Safeguard Measures
As the last paragraph indicates, the bureaucrats will be the central ﬁgure in judging on the appli-
cation of a safeguard measure because they investigate following the rules. But, it is very unlikely
that they are the only ﬁgure in the implementation of a safeguard measure. This is the point
which the previous literatures on the administered protection have shown. Speciﬁcally, some pro-
ducers will lobby politicians for a safeguard and thus politicians will press the bureaucrats for a
safeguard. As a result, the bureaucrats will implement a safeguard with their political discretion
and, consequently, producers will gain at the expense of consumers. Let us ﬁgure out how they
are related in turn.
Look at the relationship between the bureaucrats and politicians. Basically the bureaucrats
follow the rules, whatever they are regarding a safeguard, and play a key role in the implementation
of a safeguard. However, the bureaucrats are not always free from the political inﬂuences of
politicians. This is because politicians are in a position to press the bureaucrats. In some cases,
politicians are able to take any means such as a budget allocation and a personnel assignment.
This is why we think the bureaucrats themselves are subject to political inﬂuences.
Next, look at the relationship between the politicians and producers, wherein we ﬁnd the
incentives for politicians to exert their inﬂuences. Politicians, to win the coming election, seek for
political supports, like cooperation in election and political contribution. Thus, they are willing
to press the bureaucrats for safeguard measures for the sake of political supports from producers.
This is how a political relationship between them is formed.
Two points are noted on the relationship between politicians and producers. The ﬁrst point to
note is that politicians tend to favor the interest groups consisting of a group of people, instead of
individuals. Because they can expect more political support from the interest group, politicians are
likely to work for the beneﬁt of such interest groups rather than individuals’ beneﬁt. The diﬀerence
in the expected political supports gets politicians to favor the interest groups. The second point to
note is that, among its constituencies, producers are more likely to organize such interest groups
rather than consumers. This stems from the fact that there is a particular expense necessary to
8organize an interest group and that a safeguard measure leads to the costs to be diﬀused over the
consumers and the gains to be concentrated on the relevant industry. Thus, because organizing an
interest group pays for producers, not consumers, producers will be successfully in a better position
to lobby20. For these two reasons, politicians and producers are in a close political relationship.
Consequently, politicians pressing the bureaucrats tend to promote the trade policy to beneﬁt
producers at the expense of consumers. What is emphasized is that the pressure from politicians to
the bureaucrats depends directly on the lobbying from producers to politicians. The more petitions
from producers, the more pressures from politicians to the bureaucrats. This is potentially a
mechanism to make a safeguard measure formed by a political factor.
Model
We build a simple model to express the political situation we described so far21. The approach
we employ is similar to Findlay and Wellisz (1982) in that the probability of a safeguard measure
being implemented depends partly on the size of producers’ lobbying22. We consider under what
conditions the size of political activities from the producers to the politicians becomes larger and
consequently the implementation of a safeguard measure becomes more inﬂuenced by political
factors.
Consider a small open economy. Let us suppose there is a sharp rise in the import of a
good and serious injury to its competitive domestic producers, due to a drop in the world price
and also that the bureaucrats are going to judge whether to implement a safeguard measure as a
necessary policy for the entire economy. To clarify essential issues, assume that the policy taken as a
safeguard measure is only a quantitative restriction. As we have seen, in principle, the quantitative
restrictions for imports is required to follow the strict rules. When a safeguard measure is imposed
on a quantity basis, the bureaucrats have to take the WTO rule into account. Let yS and yF with
p¤
W be the limited import quantity as a result of a safeguard measure and the import quantity
20See Olson (1965).
21There are a lot of literatures for how political factors inﬂuence a trade policy and this ﬁeld is known as an
endogenous trade protection theory. See Hillman (1989), Rodrik (1995) and Helpman (1997) for a comparative
survey on this ﬁeld. Rodrik classiﬁes into ﬁve approaches; (i) the tariﬀ-formation function approach, (ii) the
political support function approach, (iii) the median voter approach, (iv) the campaign contributions approach, and
(v) the political contributions approach.
22See Moore and Suranovis (1992).
9with the dropped world price under a free trade, thus yS < yF. Further, let ¼(yS) and ¼(yF) be
the proﬁts to domestic producers in each case, where ¼(yS) > ¼(yF). That is, we suppose that,
the lower the world price, the more the import, and thus the lower the proﬁt, d¼=dyF < 0.
Also, suppose that whether the safeguard measure is eventually implemented depends on three
factors. The ﬁrst factor is associated with the conditions speciﬁed under the WTO Agreement on
Safeguards (hereafter, the WTO rule-based conditions). We deﬁne v as the parameter reﬂecting
them and assume that, when v increases, the policy is more likely to be implemented. For example,
when the import rises rapidly or when domestic producers lose seriously due to the rapid rise in
imports, v increase. The second factor, denoted as c, reﬂects the circumstance which is indirectly
related to the rise in imports. The factor includes productivity and capacity utilization (see
the WTO Agreement on Safeguard Article 4.2 (a).). We simply assume that if c increases, the
bureaucrats ﬁnd it reasonable to institute a safeguard measure. The third factor is associated with
the political pressure to the bureaucrats. We deﬁne z and g as the level of producers’ lobbying
to politicians and the level of politicians’ pressure to the bureaucrats. We assume that g = g(z)
where dg=dz > 0 and d2g=dz2 < 0. Among three of them, to clarify our argument, we consider the
ﬁrst factor and the third factor as the WTO rule-based factor and the political factor, respectively.
Therefore, we have the probability function which shows the possibility of the safeguard measure
being implemented as an equation (1);
P = P(v(yF;c);g(z)); (1)
where @P=@j > 0; j = v;g, @2P=@g2 < 0, and @v=@l > 0; l = yF;c. We assume that the marginal
eﬀect of the politicians’ pressure on the probability is negative.
While modeling a political activity is a task in itself, we simply assume it is only producers
who can organize an interest group to lobby for a safeguard measure. Such political activities need
some expense. Then, let h = h(z) and f be the cost associated with political activity and the ﬁxed
cost to organize an interest group, where we assume dh=dz > 0 and d2h=dz2 > 0.
Now, let us begin the analysis as a whole. The objective function to producers is shown as an
10equation (2);
E = P(v(yF;c);g(z))¼(yS) + (1 ¡ P(v(yF;c);g(z)))¼(yF) ¡ h(z) ¡ f: (2)












where ˆ ¼ = ¼(yS)¡¼(yF) and the second order condition is met (@2E=@z2 < 0). The ﬁrst term of
the equation (3) shows the marginal beneﬁt of political activity, while the second term shows the
marginal cost.
Let us examine the cases that the lobbying activity becomes stronger. Obviously, from the
equation (3), we have three conditions. When the marginal cost of political activity falls, when the
marginal eﬀect of politicians’ pressure to the relevant bureaucrats rises, and when the marginal
eﬀect of producers’ lobbying to politicians rises, the level of producers’ lobbying, z, increases.
Further, consider the eﬀect of the increase in the current import on the producers’ lobbying.








ˆ ¼(@2P=@g@v)(@v=@yF)(dg=dz) ¡ (@P=@g)(dg=dz)(d¼=dyF)
@2E=@z2 ; (4)
As the equation 4 shows, the sign of dz=dyF depends on the cross-partial derivative of @2P=@v@g.
Pay attention to that @2P=@v@g denotes the marginal eﬀect of the WTO rule-based conditions on
the marginal eﬀect of politicians’ pressure. It means, when the cross-partial derivative is positive,
inﬂuences exerted by politicians and the WTO rule-based conditions are like complements and
when it is negative, they are like substitutes. Thus, when there is a rise in imports and they are
like complements, the level of lobbying activity becomes higher. On the other hand, when they
are like substitutes, it may be lower. However, even when the sign of @2P=@v@g is negative, if the
value is too small to ignore, the numerator is positive. Then, in this particular case too, the level
of lobbying activity will be higher.
Much emphasis should be placed on that a rise in imports can get producers to lobby for a
safeguard. Note that so far we have not thought of how the producers’ lobbying activity starts.
11Therefore, this result will give a part of the answers. Through this mechanism, when there is a
sharp rise in imports, producers are induced to lobby for a safeguard measure.
Proposition When a safeguard is at issue, producers’ lobbying to politicians becomes stronger
under each condition, (i) when the marginal cost associated with the lobbying activity falls, (ii)
when the marginal eﬀect of politicians’ pressure to the relevant bureaucrats raises, (iii) when the
marginal eﬀect of producers’ lobbying to politicians raises, and, in particular, if there is a sharp rise
in import, (iv) when inﬂuences exerted by politicians and the WTO rule-based conditions are like
complements, and (v) when, even if (iv) is not satisﬁed, the marginal eﬀect of the WTO rule-based
conditions on the marginal eﬀect of politicians’ pressure is too small.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Framework of the empirical analysis
This section sets out an examination on whether there is a capricious use of the safeguard measure
caused by political factors in the implementation system of Japan. It is desirable that, like the
previous literatures, we collect some explanatory variables for the goods which were investigated
for a safeguard and analyze what factors were eﬀective over the implementation of a safeguard
measure. However, the scope of our empirical research is inevitably limited because the Japanese
government has investigated only six agricultural goods of tomatoes, onions, sweet peppers, Welsh
onions, Shiitake mushrooms (fresh) and Tatami rushes, vis-a-vis a safeguard measure. Then, to
overcome the shortcoming, we focused on a recent development in the Japanese safeguard system,
the monitoring system on safeguard measures.
The monitoring system on safeguard measure is a system prepared in April 2001 by the MAFF.
Its purpose is to collect any information on agricultural and marine products, which is necessary
for a safeguard measure to be imposed. Speciﬁcally, the system consists of two groups, Level 1 and
Level 2. The goods under the former group include garlic, eggplant, Shiitake mushroom (dried) and
they are investigated under a normal monitoring system. Thus, the data obliged under the WTO
Agreement on safeguards are collected quarterly or at a cropping season. And, the goods under the
12latter group include a Welsh onion, Shiitake mushroom (fresh), tomatoes, green-peppers, onions,
wakame weeds, lumber, eels and they are investigated under the emergent system. In principle,
the monthly data are to be collected on these goods.
Given the purpose and the functions of the monitoring system, we employ the monitoring
system for the empirical research on the future implementation of the safeguard measure. Our
idea is that, because a good under the monitoring system is more likely to be the subject for
a safeguard in the near future, the producers have some incentives to get their products listed.
Thus, it is naturally justiﬁed to use the monitoring system as an alternative setting. Further, to
clarify the essential issues, we consider the most typical goods in the monitoring system, vegetables.
Then, let us examine why only several vegetables have been chosen as goods possibly protected by
safeguard measures, using an empirical method.
In the following empirical analysis, the explanatory variables are divided into two categories,
the WTO rule-based conditions and political factors, while the dependent variable is considered to
show whether the vegetable is chosen as a monitored good by the MAFF. Such a dependent variable
is a qualitative dependent variable which takes either 0 or 1. Deﬁne 1 (0) as a good speciﬁed (not
speciﬁed) under the monitoring system. As the variable is discrete, then it is appropriate to use a
non-linear probability model. Hereafter, we use a probit analysis23.
We sampled 22 vegetables of Carrots, Edible Burdocks, Lotus root, Taros, Chinese Cabbages,
Welsh Onions, Onions, Eggplants, Tomatoes, Cucumbers, Pumpkins and Squashes, Sweet Peppers,
Peas, Soybeans, Kidney Beans, Sweet Corns, Lettuces, Celeries, Cauliﬂower, Broccoli, Shiitake
mushrooms (fresh), Shiitake mushrooms (dried), and Garlics. Among 32 goods24, we sampled
them out by excluding 10 goods. We excluded six vegetables which show the extreme up and
down within 1997 through 2000, one vegetable that the competitive import obviously decreased in
the same period, and three vegetables that the product diﬀerentiation within the good is widely
known. The ﬁrst group of vegetables reﬂect the occasional climate and changes in the weather
23See Maddala (1992) and Green (2000).
24These are 31 items that the MAFF annually investigates their production and shipment plus a garlic which was
chosen under the monitoring system, though not annually investigated.
13so that it may be impossible to evaluate the possibility of a safeguard measure. For the second
group, even the prerequisite is not satisﬁed. For the third group of vegetables, each of them
generally varies from a high-quality goods to a low-quality goods so that we thought of them as
less import-competitive than other vegetables25.
3.2 Explanatory Variables and Expected Signs
In this subsection, we will see each of explanatory variables we use in the probit analysis. As the
monitoring system itself is designed for a safeguard measure, it is reasonable to think that, for
those goods, all (or most) of the WTO rule-based conditions were met (or likely to be met). We
begin with the explanatory variables to represent the WTO rule-based conditions and those of
political factors26.
As an explanatory variable for a rise in imports, we use a ratio of the average imports of
1999 and 2000 over those of 1997 and 1998. Since data on vegetables are largely aﬀected by
the occasional climate and the changes in the environment, the averaged data is employed for its
adjustment. We use the quantities examined minus the quantities disposed of through customs.
Also, in the WTO ℡ Agreement on Safeguards Article IV, the share of the domestic market is one
of the factors to be evaluated, but the correlation coeﬃcient between them is so high, i.e., 0.983.
Thus, we do not employ it.
As an explanatory variable for an incurred loss, we use the diﬀerential between the average
sales of 1999 and 2000 and those of 1997 and 1998. We calculate each sale just by the price of the
vegetable times the quantity being shipped.
As an explanatory variable for the causal relationship, we use the import competitiveness. In
this paper, the import competitiveness is deﬁned as the degree of how import competitive the
domestic shipment are in domestic market. Then, the larger this indicator is, the more import-
competitive the corresponding good is and thereby, when the import rises sharply, the more loss
will be incurred compared with that in a less import-competitive good. We calculate this indicator
25As a result, we took oﬀ Japanese radishes, Turnips, Yams, Cabbages, Spinaches, Potatoes (the ﬁrst group) and
Sweet Corn (the second group) and Strawberries, Water Melons Melons (the third group).
26See Appendix A for the sources of these data.
14by adding 1 to the correlated coeﬃcient between imports and domestic shipment of the monthly
transaction in Tokyo wholesale market from 1997 through 200027.
We mention two points. By a simple reﬂection of each variable, we see the expected signs are
all positive. And, if all the selected goods under the monitoring system satisfy these indicators
only, the system is neutral along with the WTO rules.
On political factors with respect to the level of producers’ political activity, no data is virtually
available to us. However, as we emphasized, they are much likely to play a key role within the
implementation system of safeguard measures and, of course, in the monitoring system. Thus, by
any means, we need to see the size of producers’ lobbying.
Then, alternatively, we look back on Proposition (hereafter, Prop) in the last section and
consider the explanatory variables to reﬂect the political factors to indicate the level of political
activities. On marginal costs (Prop (i)), we are not sure whether it acts as an explanatory variable
in that it does not make any diﬀerence on each political activity. We do not think the marginal
cost for a political activity will be very high to a producer and very low to the other. Thus, we
ignore this factor.
On the marginal eﬀect of politicians’ pressure to the relevant bureaucrats (Prop (ii)), we con-
sider it increases when the Lower House member from a vegetable producing area belongs to the
committee on agricultural policies or already is inﬂuential in the governing party, the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan28. Consequently, we suggest two explanatory variables. The
ﬁrst variable shows that the Lower House member from a vegetable producing area belongs to the
Committee on Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (CAFF). The second variable shows that the
Lower House member of the LDP from a vegetable producing area has been elected more than three
times. We calculate the ﬁrst indicator by computing the number of the CAFF per prefecture times
the number of farmers over the number of labors times the ratio of the shipment per vegetable and
per prefecture and adding up to more than 50 %, but less than 60 % from the largest prefecture in
27See Appendix B.
28Historically as well as at present, the relationship between the agricultural policy and the Liberal Democratic
Party is always very close. See Aurelia (2000).
15the production. And, similarly, we have the second variable by substituting the number of the more
than three times elected politicians for the number of those who belong to the CAFF. The way of
weighting for the CAFF (resp. the more than three times elected politicians) reﬂects that, as the
ratio of production in a prefecture is high and as the labor ratio of agriculture in the prefecture is
high, the corresponding Lower House member is more willing to exert its inﬂuences on the MAFF
(resp. within the LDP) for its own sake. Also, the sum up to more than 50 %, but less than 60 %
from the largest prefecture in the production reﬂects that the Lower members are more interested
in vegetables with the high shipment ratio from his/her elected (and the producing) area29. And
this is how we combine the marginal eﬀect of producers’ lobbying to politicians of Prop (iii).
As some reports noted, the safeguard measures on three vegetables in April 2001 might be aimed
at the coming-election campaign of the Upper House. Thus, we suggest one variable to show this
possibility for the governing party. If the safeguard measure is designed for the election campaign,
the governing party becomes more interested in the vegetables whose producing areas have more
voters working in agriculture and more electoral districts per prefecture (more single-seat districts).
We consider the governing party’s pressure to the relevant bureaucrats are marginally higher in
vegetables with such features than those without. The third and last explanatory variable is gained
by substituting the number of the single-seat districts in the Lower House for the number of those
who attend to the CAFF.
Again, by a simple reﬂection of each political explanatory variable, we see the expected signs
are all positive. And, if all the selected goods under the monitoring system satisfy these political
explanatory variables only, the system is formed by political factors.
In light of (iv) and (v), one point should be noted. It is the possibility that the rise in imports
can induce the political activity of producers. If this is of more importance, the coeﬃcient on
imports reﬂects more than the MAFF’s view as a WTO rule-based condition.
29The WTO Agreement on Safeguards Article 4.1.(c) states, “in determining injury or threat thereof, a “domestic
industry” shall be understood to mean the producers ¢¢¢ whose collective output of the like or directly compet-
itive products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those products.” In Japan, as
Komuro (2001) notes, “the major proportion” is deﬁned as 50 percent.
163.3 Probit Estimation
Table 1 shows the probit estimation wherein we select the model 2 by Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC)30, following the estimation with full variables. In the model 2, the losses and the CAFF
indicator are 5 % level of signiﬁcance and the import-competitiveness is 10 % level of signiﬁcance.
These expected signs match the signs gained through the probit analysis. The absolute value
for the coeﬃcients of the CAFF indicator are much larger than that of the losses. The MAFF,
according to the WTO rules, seems to consider the highly import-competitive vegetables and the
vegetables whose producers have been seriously injured as the subject goods for the safeguard
measures. More importance, however, should be put on the fact that the Lower House member in
the CAFF is likely to exert his/her inﬂuence over the selection of the monitored vegetables.
Also, Table 1 has the result of the model 3 only with the WTO rule-based conditions, though
the AIC does not select it. In the model 3, all the expected signs match the signs gained through the
probit analysis and the losses is the only statistically signiﬁcant variable. It should be emphasized
that the ﬁtness of the model 2 is remarkably improved compared with that of the model 3. We also
undertake likelihood ratio test to see if the model 2 diﬀered signiﬁcantly from the model 3. The
likelihood ratio test rejects the hypothesis at the 1 % level of signiﬁcance. In addition, the model
2 is strongly supported by the likelihood ratio index and Eﬀron’s R2. This is because the CAFF
indicator makes a substantial inﬂuence over the result. Consequently, we make a conclusion that
the monitoring system for a safeguard is not so much neutral along with the WTO conditions and
the political inﬂuence is more or less found.
We know that the rise in imports and the electoral districts indicator in the model 2 are not
statistically signiﬁcant and these estimated signs do not match the expected signs. For the rise
in imports, we calculated the two-year average and employed the ratio to ease the impact of the
occasional climate. To make assessment more properly, it would be necessary for us to account for
all the eﬀect on every vegetable caused by external shock such as occasional climates. However, we
have no information what the MAFF will refer to in investigation. And, for the electoral districts,
30Schwartz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC) selects the model 2, too.
17we tried to have a look at the election campaign of the governing party. To make assessment
more properly, it would be necessary for us to account for the governing party’s evaluation on how
many votes are gained in which electoral district per prefecture. However, we are unable to collect
such information. Also, the governing party is not always concerned about only the number of
electoral district. For instance, it may pay more attention to the district where the governing party
lost in the last election. For these reasons, we may fail to demonstrate our intentions by the two
parameters and thus the diﬀerent signs are shown in the probit analysis.
For sure, further improvement is necessary in many respects. Our research is subject to the
limited availability of data and we should make our argument more precisely for the process of the
variables, the formulation and the analytical method. However, subject to several limitations, we
note that our analysis is still valuable. As we have expected, there is the potential inﬂuence of
political factors in the monitoring system for a safeguard. Among them, the CAFF is demonstrated
as a key factor.
4 Conclusion
Generally speaking, the administrative protection, including a safeguard measure, is less inﬂuenced
by political factors. This is because their decision is subject to the WTO rules and because the
bureaucrats, unlike politicians, are not directly inﬂuenced by political activities. However, indeed,
a safeguard measure is much more inﬂuenced by political factors. It is because there are no speciﬁcs
as to the conditions of the implementation in the rules regarding a safeguard and, thereby, because
politicians are in a position to exert their inﬂuence on the bureaucrats by any means, seeking for
political supports from inﬂuential interest groups.
This paper used a model to show the relationship among players surrounding a safeguard mea-
sure and empirically examined whether the Japanese safeguard system is inﬂuenced by political
factors. In the model analysis, special attention should be paid to the implication from Prop (iv)
and (v). It states producers’ petitions to politicians become stronger if the competitive import
sharply increases. Thus, when there is a rise in the competitive imports, the corresponding pro-
18ducers tend to lobby for a safeguard to politicians. When facing with such lobbying activities,
politicians will press the bureaucrats for a safeguard to gain political supports from producers.
In the empirical analysis, we focused on the monitoring system and examined which factors,
the WTO rule-based conditions or the political factors, are of more importance. Our empirical
analysis is subject to the limited availability of data and some improvement will be necessary for
the process of the variables, the formulation and the assessment method. However, subject to these
limitations, we based our analysis on the two groups of factors and argued that the monitoring
system for a safeguard is not so much neutral along with the WTO conditions and the political
inﬂuence is more or less found.
This result may be related to a fact that those who investigate are from the relevant ministries
in Japan. By taking account of this point, we can argue that a neutral institution, like the
International Trade Commission in the United States, should be established in Japan and more
information need to be taken into consideration. But, as empirical studies by Moore (1992a) as
well as some other papers show, even such institution is often inﬂuenced by political factors on
the approval of the anti-dumping. Thus, for the moment, we should carefully attempt to build a
system so as to keep away from political factors and evaluate the cost and beneﬁt of a safeguard
measure as a society as a whole.
They are what we have seen in this paper, but we have some issues left. In a model analysis,
we do not consider the bureaucrats as those who are self-interested and do not think of how the
bureaucrats interact among them and how they govern a safeguard measure. Thus, we leave the
government structure a black box. Also, in an empirical analysis, we should use more appropriate
variable on imports and the one to represent the politicians’ pressure to the bureaucrats. On these
issues, it is necessary for a further improvement and we have these left for the future.
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22Appendix A : Data Source
Import (other than Shiitake mushrooms (fresh) and (dried)), Statistics on Plant Quarantine,
(Shokubutsu-Keneki-Toukei), Statistics and Information Department, MAFF.
Import (Shiitake mushrooms (fresh) and (dried)), foreign trade statistics, (Boueki-toukei),
MOF.
Price, Report of Survey on Vegetables and Fruits Wholesale Markets, (Seikabutu-Oroshiuri-
shijou-chousa-houkoku), Statistics and Information Department, MAFF.
Quantities (Shipment), Statistics on Production and Shipment of Vegetable, (Yasai-seisann-
shukka-toukei), for Data of 2000, production comes from “Statistical Survey on Shipment of Veg-
etables and Fruits and Nuts,” Statistics and Information Department, MAFF.
Import Competitiveness, Annual Report in Tokyo Metropolitan Central Wholesale Market,
(Tokyo-to-chuuou-orosiuri-shijou-nennpou), Tokyo Metropolitan Central Wholesale Market.
The Number of Labours, National Census, (Kokuzei-Chousa), Management and Coordination
Agency.
The Number of farmers, The Number of farmers, (Nougyou-shuugyou-jinkou), Statistics and
Information Department, MAFF.
All the political data are from Handbook of Politics No. 36, (seiji-handbook), The Center for
Political and Public Relations Inc, 2000.
23Appendix B : A Note on Import Competitiveness
Production of agricultural goods, such as vegetables, depends much on the seasonal changes and
occasional climate of the producing areas. Then, unlike manufacture goods, there are two features
of the agricultural goods; (i) the quantities produced are not easily adjusted and (ii) each goods has
a sort of cycles for its shipment. Recognizing these features, we may have to consider the import
competitiveness in vegetables in light of the seasonality of domestic production (or shipment) and
the timing of import.
Figure 1 (a) and (b) shows the monthly shipment quantities of a pumpkin and a garlic in the
Tokyo wholesale market for the domestic shipment and the import, respectively. As Figure 1 (a)
shows, on the pumpkin, the cycle of its domestic shipment and its import is almost reversed. It
means the pumpkin is not at all import-competitive and the trade obviously leads to the beneﬁts
for the consumers so that they are able to consume whenever it is. In contrast, a garlic is very
import-competitive. Figure 1 (b) shows the domestic production and the import have a similar
cycle.
Our hypothesis is that, the more import-competitive a vegetable is, the more likely it is to
be the subject of the safeguard measure since the more import competitive goods shall be more
aﬀected by a sharp rise in the import. (Also, similarly, we can expect such reasoning applies to a
loss.) In Section 3, we use the correlation coeﬃcient between the domestic goods and the import
in the Tokyo wholesale market from 1997 to 2000 as the parameter for the import-competitiveness.
To make the parameter positive, we add one to it. Also, while a pumpkin shows the lowest value,
a garlic shows the highest.
24Table 1: Probit Estimates
Model1 Model2 Model3
Parameter Estimate Estimate Estimate
Constant -3.4705 -3.3635 -2.6574
(-0.6419) (-0.7549) (-2.2335)
Import Competitiveness 3.6086 3.5431 1.0578
(1.2896) (1.7101) (1.0562)
Losses 0.0452 0.0445 0.0117
(1.4565) (1.9640) (2.3757)
Import -0.2905 -0.2839 0.1278
(-0.4900) (-0.5067) (0.3349)
Electoral District -0.3025 -0.2937
(-0.9669) (-1.5733)
More than three times 0.0070
elected politicians (0.0354)
The CAFF 1.24881 1.2246
(1.3503) (2.0184)
LL -4.5315 -4.5321 -9.5021
SBIC 15.3502 13.8053 15.6842
AIC 11.5315 10.5321 13.5021
Likelihood ratio index 0.6858 0.6857 0.3411
Eﬀron’s R2 0.7125 0.7135 0.4172
Note: t-statistics is in parentheses.
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